tem. At this time an algorism was any book related to the subject. The algorisms were
the four arithmetic operations. An algorist was one who calculated in the new number
system as opposed to an abacist who used an abacus. By 1500 the algorists had pre-
vailed and the abacists had largely disappeared from Europe.
These algorisms were strictly mechanical procedures to manipulate symbols. They
could be carried out by an ignorant person mechanically following simple rules, with no
understanding of the theory of operation, requiring no cleverness and resulting in a cor-
rect answer. The same procedures are taught to grade school children today. Computing
with Roman numerals on the other hand required considerable skill and ingenuity. There
also existed at this time other examples of mechanical formulation such as Euclid's
method to find the greatest common denominator of two numbers. The fact that dumb
mechanical manipulations could produce significant and subtle computational results
fascinated the medieval mathematicians. They wondered if it was possible that the
whole of mathematics or even all of human knowledge could be mechanically formulated
and calculated with simple rules of symbol manipulation.
Leibniz attempted just such a formulation in the 1660s with his calculus ratiocinator
or characteristica universalis. The object was to "enable the truths of any science, when
formulated in the universal language, to be computed by arithmetical operations" [1].
Arithmetical here refers to the algorisms. Insight, ingenuity and imagination would no
longer be required in mathematics or science. Leibniz did not succeed and the idea lay
fallow for two hundred years.
During this period, Euclidian geometry, with its axioms and rules of reasoning from
the simple to the complex continued to reign as the fundamental paradigm of mathemat-
ics. In the 1680's, after the invention of analytical geometry and having made new dis-
coveries with his own invention of his fluxional calculus, Newton was careful to cast all
the mathematical demonstrations in his presentation of these new discoveries in
Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica in classical Euclidian geometry. A symbolic
analytical presentation would neither have been understood nor accepted by his contem-
poraries. Geometry, which dealt with relationships among points, lines and surfaces, was
intuitive, obvious and real. Algebra, dealt with arbitrary symbols related by arbitrary rules
and did not relate to any specific reality.While algebra was practical and useful it was not
considered fit territory for fundamental theoretical consideration. Late into the nineteenth
century symbolic computation was distrusted and discounted.This attitude is exemplified
by a nineteenth century astronomer who remarked that he had not the "smallest confi-
dence in any result which is essentially obtained by the use of imaginary symbols" [2].
The dream of formalizing thought in terms of mechanical manipulation of symbols
reemerged with the symbolic logic of George Boole presented in his book Laws of
Thought in 1854. Boole argued persuasively that logic should be a part of mathematics
as opposed to its traditional role as a part of philosophy. Frege went several steps further
and suggested that not only should logic be a part of mathematics but that mathematics
should be founded on logic and began a program to derive all of mathematics in terms of
logic.
Meanwhile the paradigmatic edifice of Euclidian geometry was beginning to show
cracks with the discovery of non Euclidian geometries which were internally consistent
and therefore were just as valid mathematical systems as Euclidian geometry. Symbolic
computation achieved paradigmatic preeminence with the publication in 1899 of Hilbert's