Computer science with its mathematical heritage retains these humans in the works.
From the computer science point of view these humans constitute an element of arbitrarily suffi-
cient expressivity which presents a difficulty. If one is only interested in the nature of the symbol
system independent of how it might be expressed then any workable expression of a symbol
system will suffice, and appeal to arbitrarily sufficient expressivity can be conveniently effective,
but if one is seeking insight into the nature of expression itself, the presence of arbitrarily suffi-
cient expressivity fundamentally undermines the effort.
If there is an arbitrarily sufficient interstitial mortar then the conceptual pieces do not
have to fit well. Any pieces can be glued together into an apparently universal whole that is ade-
quately functional and that can even appear to be simple in some compelling sense. But such a
fudged model cannot provide insightful understanding or unifying connections.The element of
arbitrary sufficiency eliminates the necessity of the pieces fitting and precludes the possibility of
discovering the appropriate pieces and how they might fit. Appeal to arbitrary sufficiency can
reveal nothing about essential necessity. A useful conceptual view can have no arbitrarily suffi-
cient mortar.
Saying a human does it in computer science is like saying a god does it in physics.The
humans in the works both enable the computer and deny it theoretical closure.This difficulty of
humans in the works is explicitly recognized in the view of the computer as an artifact and the
acceptance that computers cannot be theorized about in the same sense that natural phenom-
ena can be theorized about [2].
“If what the computer scientist says about computers in theory does not agree with
behavior, he or she can always change the computer†to match the theory [1].
This is the essential problem.There is no way to compare conceptual models.The
human in the works assures that all models, even those with partially characterizing or mislead-
ing concepts, will appear equally successful.There is no criterion of failure. With the inability to
theorize the only approach to understanding the subject appears to be experience and experi-
ment and the only approach to managing it to be imposed rationale and convention. Imposing
mathematical rationale and convention seems reasonable and convenient.
But are computers and symbol systems as artifactual as supposed? Symbolic computing
mechanisms exist in nature, particularly in biology, that computer science aspires to encom-
pass. Can a conceptual model of symbolic expression can be conceived that encompasses the